"US$101.76M of cash against no debt, with the cash alone covering 54% of the market capitalization and the business itself changing hands at 1.2 times trailing earnings. The market prices Selinsing as a mine about to run out of ore, because the last published reserve statement dates to 2019 and rests on drilling data from March 2018. The mine has produced for eight years past that data date, and every observable capital decision points to a mine being prepared for a longer life, not a closure."
Monument Mining digs gold-bearing sulfide rock out of open pits at Selinsing in Pahang, Malaysia, concentrates it through flotation and sells the concentrate to buyers, at a run rate of about 46,000 ounces a year. The 1.0 million tonne per annum plant sits in the middle of the company's Malaysian ground, which also includes the adjacent Buffalo Reef, Felda and Famehub properties along the same gold trend. A second processing plant, Burnakura in Western Australia, sits idle on care and maintenance. At 31 March 2026 the company carried US$101.76M in cash and term deposits against no debt beyond US$0.08M of leases. The market values the whole company at about US$190M, so the enterprise value is roughly US$89M against US$74.1M of after-tax earnings in the twelve months to March 2026. You are paying 1.2 times trailing earnings for the business once cash is deducted, and the cash alone covers 54% of the market capitalization.
The economics are those of a small, cheap-to-run mine in a very strong gold market. In the March 2026 quarter Monument sold 10,478 ounces at a realized price of US$5,166 per ounce, against a cash cost of US$1,390 and an all-in sustaining cost of US$1,583 per ounce sold, both non-IFRS measures. For the nine months ended 31 March 2026 the mine produced 35,040 ounces at an all-in sustaining cost of US$1,323 per ounce. The plant processed 243,367 tonnes in the quarter at a feed grade of 1.67 g/t and a recovery of 89.75%, its best throughput since the flotation circuit was commissioned, helped by a new filter press that removed a bottleneck. The company reached this point the slow way: Selinsing ran for years as an oxide mine on carbon-in-leach processing, then spent a difficult stretch building and tuning a flotation plant as the oxides gave way to sulfide ore at depth. The transition completed in the third quarter of fiscal 2023 and the earnings followed, from US$6.44M of net income in fiscal 2024 to US$37.54M in fiscal 2025 and US$53.31M in the first nine months of fiscal 2026.
The reason the opportunity exists is a document. The most recent NI 43-101 technical report is dated 31 January 2019 and its reserves are depleted only to 31 March 2018: proven and probable reserves of 5.7 million tonnes at 1.45 g/t for 267,000 ounces, at a US$1,300 gold price assumption. The 2019 feasibility study built on those reserves described a mine life of about six years covering 223,000 recovered ounces, and fiscal 2024 through the first nine months of fiscal 2026 alone produced about 105,000 ounces. On paper the mine plan is finished. A generalist cannot underwrite the mine life from public documents, so most simply pass and the stock trades as if the last published plan were the whole truth. The shareholder register does the rest: Malaco Mining, a Malaysian group whose executive chairman sits on the five-person board, holds about 15.9% of today's 346.2 million shares, and a holder that size with a board seat, in a Malaysian asset, on a venture exchange, keeps most institutions out regardless of the numbers.
Against that, the mine as currently operated converts gold into cash at a rate the price ignores. Operating cash flow for the nine months to March 2026 was US$68.4M while spending on plant, development and exploration together was US$7.6M. Free cash flow of roughly US$61M in nine months is what carried cash and deposits from US$45.9M at 30 June 2025 to US$101.76M at 31 March 2026, and that is after paying a special dividend of two Canadian cents per share, US$5.04M, in January 2026. Strip out the exceptional realized price and the picture survives: at US$3,000 gold, 28% below the 3 July 2026 spot price, current volumes of 46,000 ounces and an all-in cost near US$1,550 would leave about US$67M of pre-tax operating margin, or roughly US$47M a year of earnings after corporate costs and tax. The enterprise value is under two times that stress-tested number.
The exhaustion assumption also sits badly with both the resource data and the company's behavior. The same 2019 report that shows 267,000 ounces of reserves shows measured and indicated resources of 530,000 ounces and inferred resources of a further 350,000 ounces at a US$2,400 shell, all on 2018 drilling, all at cut-off assumptions set when gold traded at a third of today's price. Through the first three quarters of fiscal 2026 the company drilled 13,045 metres around Buffalo Reef and Felda, with 58 holes in the March quarter alone, releasing assays in December 2025, February 2026 and May 2026 that it describes as intersecting multiple mineralized zones beyond the current pit shells. Meanwhile management is buying filter presses, extending the concentrate warehouse and relocating site infrastructure to allow pit pushbacks; nobody spends this way on a mine with three years to live. Everything outside the Selinsing perimeter then comes free: the Murchison project in Western Australia carries the idle Burnakura plant, a 293,000 ounce indicated resource at 2.3 g/t, the Gabanintha deposit and a 20% free-carried interest at Tuckanarra, carried at US$53.6M of exploration and evaluation assets and assigned no value in the base case. In the bear case, where the drilling fails and only three years of ore remain at US$2,600 gold, roughly US$81M of remaining earnings on top of US$102M of cash is US$183M against a US$190M market capitalization, a modest loss of zero to twenty percent. The base case, five years at 46,000 ounces and US$3,500 gold, discounts to about US$345M or C$1.41, some 80% above today's price while still giving Murchison nothing. The bull case, eight years at gold near US$4,100, is about US$545M, around C$2.20.
Over the years, I've spent a lot of time on investment platforms, forums, newsletters and communities. Great ideas everywhere: tickers, theses, one-liners that make you think. But I always had the same problem: when I find something interesting, I still have to do all the research myself. Every time.
I looked for research that was actually complete, a real deep-dive where you can follow the reasoning, check the numbers and disagree with the conclusion if you want. Rarely found it. Especially on small-caps, where institutional coverage is thin and mispricing opportunities are real. So I built it myself.
Read more about the process and the checklist →This report represents the personal opinion of the author and is published for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute investment advice, a solicitation to buy or sell securities, or a recommendation of any kind. All analysis is based on publicly available information. The author may hold positions in the securities discussed. Investing involves risk of loss. Past analysis does not guarantee future results. Nothing here should be relied upon as the basis for any investment decision.